economics or oil, but through education. america built the universities in beirut, in cairo, american universities in turkey, through which american educators imparted american ideas. perhaps the most influential idea was the idea ofi encouraged george bush to challenge harry reid las vegas. he did not. the pro forma sessions do not change the fact that the senate was unavailable. it was on a planned 20-day no business break. it was gone. there was no forum to be had. the constitution, in my view exclusively grants the executive , both responsibility to determine senate availability and discretion to sign temporary commissions.

clause three is intended to authorize the president singly alone, to make temporary of home at -- appointments. clause three, intended to authorize the president singly to make temporary appointments. only the executive has the institutional competence to know when such appointment action is required. for his article two, section three mandate he is required. he takes an oath. he takes an oath to god to take care that the laws be faithfully executed and commission all officers of the united states

these are available. double-click away for you. it is exhausting in the detailing why the temporary appointment authority can be exercised. and for pre-existing conditions. the solicitor general rises to the challenge and defeats. he breaks out the yield's, the canaries and contemporary practices of the founding era.

the briefs appendix with us -- list the names of judges who are in cross-section and recessed commissions have an band. counting military appointments the numbers go into the thousands. while i strongly support the solicitor general's position, i do have to come forward to say i strongly believe he made a mistake. the mistake was he should have made a preemptive argument. he knows that, right jacob

sometimes it works out well. i argue they present a non- reviewable political question to the courts. some questions are committed by the constitution, by the text of the constitution to the exclusive discretion. could it be that the court has a wonderful opportunity to prove its conservative restraint to stay out of the partisan appointments. details application of the cases such as carter, walter nixon versus the united states. let's just take one of them in

the interest of time. in the 1993 case, the court refused to review -- perhaps you could go more deeply. . also now the impact or potential impact as you see it at the u.s. energy revolution. as you said, the u.s. was exporting from the region and then imported. we are now facing another term in terms of the energy relationship with the region.

i was wondering if you could talk about how you think this might influence the issue you were talking about. >> when you look back at the history of presidential doctrines about the middle east and an inordinate percentage of all doctrines have to do with the middle east. talking about the carter doctrine had to do with protecting the free flow of energy from the middle east, specifically from the persian gulf region, whether it be from the threat of soviet encroachments, later from iran and even military engagements people forget the flagging operations to the later parts of the reagan administration where american were firing on iranian boats in coastal installations. forgotten. this had to do with protecting american energy sources. over the course of the

subsequent decade, you can trace america's oil consumption that was imported that decreased. i know that by the time i came on my job in 2009 as ambassador it was down to about two percent. today it is almost negligible. the notion that america might have to exert force to protect the fleet -- free flow of energy out of the persian gulf area today would be a far more remote assumption than it would be in the 19 70's and 1980's. having said all that, that does not mean the middle eastern energy is not vital to other countries in the middle east, including a country like china and that america's economy is inexplicably tied up with that of china. so albeit indirectly, the american economy remains deeply

attached to mentor -- middle eastern oil. they may not be a strategic issue but certainly a financial interest. >> you do not see that the energy boom will significantly shift u.s. approach. >> i think it will shift it as a strategic interest and less of a financial interest. president obama did not talk about the transitions we were all focused on the arab awakening. what is your view of how policy has evolved during the obama administration and do you see an underlying strategy behind the shift or how would you

explain what we are watching? >> i think the obama administration came out of the gate in 2009 at the very robust and highly specific outreach to the middle east. you look back to the cairo speech in 2009, which in many ways was the foundational document, it was perhaps the most sui generis document in the history of american policy. he addressed the adherents of a world faith. you cannot imagine him addressing the world's methodist or catholics. but he spoke with the muslim world. he was addressing a muslim world and not adjusting the citizens of muslim state.

that inadvertently conformed to an islamist notion of states being legitimate, and there is only one legitimate state which is a universally muslim state. doubt outreach has proved less successful. you do not see many echoes of it. it outstrip the ability of anybody to formulate a cookie-cutter, one policy fits all situation. the events transpired so rapidly and so radically, and so differently, whether it be egypt or syria, and we talked about libya, i would challenge anybody to try to come up with a single

policy that would address all of these. having said that, you could criticize various aspects of the policies. in retrospect, in terms of america's image in the middle east, there probably should have been a deeper breath taken. i love their weather today if there is thinking back, well, if america had been involved with syria, perhaps the jihadist influx would have been preempted. that is all monday morning quarterbacking. >> it is monday, and we are looking to saturday. let's look ahead. what is at stake, and after this question i will turn to the audience and find out what is at stake with the negotiations with iran? i know it is a big and broad question. i will let you narrow it down.

i'm wondering, from your standpoint, what is at stake? >> everything. everything. it is the future of the middle east. are we at the tectonic shift point, where we are in a post pax americana mode? is there a certain role for iran in the region? what would that hegemonic role look like from the israeli perspective and the perspective of the gulf countries?

today there's a greater confluence between israel and these gulf countries. agreeing on egypt or the fundamentals of the peace process. hope most of all that they agree on the iranian threat. that maintaining the ability to have a nuclear weapon is a unsustainable threat. it is a threat that is multifaceted. it is not just a threat of being of to put a nuclear warhead atop of the capital or any region and the city. i just watched a video clip of the iranians that they put out.

they show striking american allies in the region. the bigger threats come in the form of providing nuclear umbrellas to terrorist organizations that could attack israel or other countries in the region with relative impunity. they will have to think, if we strike back, with that precipitate an iranian breakout. that is an immense break on latitude. beyond terrorists getting access to nuclear capabilities, you do not have to worry about rockets. you have don't worry about it not being traced or going through trucks.

that is at stake for israel and other countries in the region. the big litmus test is going to come at the end of the six months of the negotiating time. the united states it's a big country far away from the middle east which has immense capabilities that nobody in the region has, not even the state of israel. if the united states can strike an agreement with iranians israel and the gulf countries are going to have to ask themselves if it is worth it? >> what are they going to have the measure if things move forward?

a could not just be a nuclear deal but it could be motivation. interestingly, one of the things you will do at the olympic council is work on the relationship between israel and the regional countries. how is it shifted already?

whether it translates to a more open relationship remains to be seen. israel has had relationships with several states. most of them are quietly pursued. there's been a much colder distance. the great example is saudi arabia, where there has not been any formal contact. it is something that i think would be the interest of all of these countries to pursue and hope that it can happen in the future. >> as you are saying, deciding whether or not they can live with whatever avenues with iran. what are the factors they would have to measure, if you are gulf state, and are there differences in the factors, or are they pretty similar?

>> you would need to see material dismantling of the iranian nuclear program. israel and iranians agreed on an aspect of the nuclear program. both of the spokespeople came out and said that president obama's claim that part of the nuclear program had been dismantled in the interim agreement was not true. they agreed on that. you'd be hard-pressed to see what parts were dismantled. the 20% stockpile in which materials were oxidized. that is only 185 kilograms of material they had.

6000 of the other materials. there are no facilities being dismantled. there are no inspections of the major military sites. now they are having inspections of the detonator sites. but the largest military base you have to see a shifting abroad of a large segment. all of the 3.5% and five percent stockpile. the cessation of work on the water facility. there would have to be concrete evidence that the iranian nuclear program has been defanged.

>> lots of questions. let me go straight out here. i will try to get everybody in order that i see them. >> i am from the energy policy research foundation. i have a couple of questions. if you look at what is happening in north america, we can easily get to 2025 and the excess capacity. there's a real problem between iraq, iran, and saudi arabia and how they divide that up. it is going to be very interesting. the second point is the reality of u.s. strategic interest in the persian gulf because it is true that the western hemisphere is likely to disconnect from the crude flows. it is also true that the gulf is still important. it there is a major event or disruption, prices will go up, even in the united states. as of the nature of the oil market, most of the adjustment has to take place in the u.s. one question i have for you, as a diplomat, how do we manage the

appearance versus the reality because within the congress within the american political structure we are going to hear we are disconnected. how you manage that politically is of great interest. >> i have i short answer. i agree. probably the shortest answer i've given in weeks.

i spoke about the impression that you can go home. i think that is an illusion. but there is also an allusion that the security and strategic aspects will not impact america's democracy, even though it is a long way. >> thank you, ambassador. jeff steinberg. i would like to suggest a slightly different narrative as to what is going on with the united states policy in the middle east and get your thoughts on it. how we possibly come to the point where we have to face up to a number of strategic errors that were made in shaping u.s. policy?

did we fail to see the long-term dangers of the spread of this in a non-terrorist form? did we have an overly optimistic and false notion of the role that the muslim brotherhood would play as a reform faction within political islam? is there also some kind of possible reaping about the actual viability of being able to achieve through diplomatic means a true solution.

they warned about the dangers. and warned about losing leverage. is united states possibly going through a kind of correction of some deep and fundamental misjudgment that forms u.s. policy over a period of time? >> the first part of that, perhaps you could take a crack at future political islam. we are seeing a difference in egypt, and i wonder if you have some sort of historian's view. >> i wish i had 1.5 hours to

respond to this. of course, america made some mistakes. there been mistakes in the middle east. the biggest problem is being able to view the middle east clearly. those a great civil war general who travel the middle east in 1872 and came back. his remark was, if we don't judge it i its own terms but continue to judge it by american terms, we will be condemned to misjudge the region. i want respond on several levels. george marshall 1948 made a number predictions about the future american role in what was then known as the palestine conflict. one of them was the united states would have to see 300,000 soldiers to defend the jewish state because they were incapable of defending

themselves, and that the jewish state would emerge. all three of those predictions were wrong to start. you could make a strong case that rather than diminishing american influence in the middle east, the fact that america is involved in the arab-israeli conflict has enhanced us. only the united states can mediate their. it will scan. that turned the argument on its head. the united states underestimate the impact of political islam? yes. it is not just america. there's a strong tendency among the american press to downplay the emotional and intellectual power of islam, according to the basics of journalistic narrative

that people turn to islam out of despair, and not that they turned to islam because it imparts positive values. beyond that, every administration comes into office with their own worldview. the obama administration came in -- and i go back to the cairo speech. president obama is addressing the muslim world and saying, you can be authentically muslim, but if you are muslim and observe democratic norms than we have a basis for strong alliance. look at the middle eastern leaders to whom the president reached out in a significant way. who are these people? these people had authentic islamic roots. they were elected democratically. they conformed to the image of the speech. was it a good decision?

maybe too early to tell. it is like the french revolution. too early to know whether it was successful. i think the administration's reaction was significant in that way. i can go on about this. i will conclude with one anecdote. you are asked the same questions in any audience. jerusalem policy. israel's policy on iran. someone asked a question i had never heard. what is more difficult explaining americans to israelis

or israelis to americans? any israeli diplomat will have the same answer. it is much more difficult to explain americans to israelis. americans basically get israel except for difficult questions. countries defending itself they get it. israelis, and not just israelis, many people who work in the middle east and look at america, and look at the faith-based and value-based foreign policy and scratch their heads. they will look at a piece of legislation. congress passed abuse of legislation that said that the united states cannot support a regime or a regime that is overthrown a democratically elected government. what if it was a government that doesn't will democratically? they don't get that. then you have explained that this is america. and that during one of the most to focal times was winter 2011.

it was surrounding the arab spring and saying, do you know where this is going to lead? democrats, republicans, cnn, fox, everybody was wildly enthusiastic about what was going on. it was my job, as difficult as it was to explain to policy makers that one million people out there demanding this wasn't resonating with the american narrative. and there was no way that americans would not get excited about that. america is what america is. that is something that is hardwired. i happen to think it is a beautiful thing, but it is not always readily understandable to people living in the middle

east. >> thank you. i am in diplomatic relations at chapel hill. the united states has unlimited resources in terms of money, time, and attention. can you identify if there is a core conflict that the united states would focus on most importantly to bring security to the middle east. the reigning conflict. egypt? what should the united states focus on as a top agenda point? >> how would you tell the president to set his priorities, is that what you are saying? >> the middle east is in three cyclones of instability. ethnic cyclone. modernity versus tradition. and the breakdown of the arab spring.

depending on where you look, different cyclones are hitting. in syria, you have all three going on at the same time. that makes were violent situation. american policymakers, and i say this with all humility, is that they have to take a strong look at which of these storms they can actually grapple with, make an impact on, lessen the damage of. in the case of syria, right now i don't know much more that the united states can do then to further extend humanity and lessen the suffering of people. in the case of egypt, where the main struggle there is between modernity and tradition, i think that require some deeper thought. if the united states can impact that situation, well. overwhelmingly, the paramount question and threat to the region is iran and the nuclear program, and whether -- and i'm going to reiterate what i said earlier -- whether any deal can be reached.

iranians need this program. they have hegemonic aspirations. one is the u.s. military and the iranian military. they have lots of aspirations. they saw what happened in libya. they sell what didn't happen in north korea. they drew conclusions from that. adding them to give up the program is very difficult, especially in the absence of a credible military threat, which doesn't exist right now? if an agreement can be reached

with the iranians, the countries of the middle east are going to have to determine whether they can live with that are not, and what would happen if they don't. that is going to be, i think the paramount strategic interest of the united states. >> thank you for the clear answer. it is great to have you with us today, sir. >> thank you, ambassador. thank you, michael. there is an op-ed today that takes up on some of the questions of u.s. leadership in the middle east and elsewhere. to which the administration response, well, look at all the things we're doing in the middle east and in syria and in negotiations with iran and with secretary kerry the middle east process. the conventional thesis of the

author is that if you're not willing to project power than your diplomatic efforts will not be taken seriously. if you look at it from a historical perspective, of course, as you did, you can find concrete reasons and more of a reluctance after two costly wars. but if you gauge it from it a historical perspective, is this more -- isolationist is too big of a term, but more inward looking. on more external projection of power. if i understood it correctly you hit a little bit at the last chapter. >> thank you. >> thank you. it is true. it is too early to tell. we know in the aftermath of traumatic wars, america goes to

times of isolationism. that was the case in the 1920's and 1970's. we do not know if this is a permanent alteration. we don't know. what we do know, in berkeley, is that there is a direct connection for america to project power, particularly in the middle east, where their sensitive to power, and for the united states to wield diplomatic influence. it used to be a criticism of the bush policies, certainly after the invasion of iran. but in december 2007, on very short notice, 40 nations sent their top leaders together really in a matter of weeks. i ask myself whether they would do that today, to that extent, and with that level of

participation. there is any number of criticisms on bush policy. there is a case that the winning of the pax americana is attributed to obama, i trace it back to where america unilaterally gave up over middle eastern peacemaking. that began in the bush administration. the fact was that bush was willing to use power. that gave him a certain degree of leverage, which i don't know if it exists today. certainly the most emphatic example i can give you is what transpired or didn't transpire regarding the arsenal.

they said it was going to be a small use of force. then he went back to congress. then they were saying what about congressional support. then it was 500-1 against. that was a clear message to the middle east that even a limited missile strike to enforce a presidentially declared redline was not going to happen. did think you can wield the same amount of diplomatic weight after that type of experience i think would be a mistake. >> thank you. >> no one said anything about the palestinian issue. >> we will come back. >> it is fascinating that you

went through the whole discourse without mentioning much about the israeli conflict, even a minute the only part of the u.s. policy that is intensely engaged in the middle east at this time with negotiations over palestine and israel. now that you are out of office and free to speak your mind, you have done some of that, and i noticed. >> you can see all this later in our schedule on the website. >> first of all, great to see you again. i mention the inability of the united states to bring about a resolution of the conflict, or even aspects of it. i know palestinians were

particularly frustrated with the inability of the administration to maintain the settlement freeze of 2010 has also impaired america's influence and created and contributed to the image of the winning pax americana in the middle east. what i would recommend to the israeli government avoid policy steps that would avoid israel's image, not just in the middle east, but the world tom and among segments of american public opinion. do the utmost to try to exhaust all diplomatic options to try to achieve peace with the palestinians. and if that fails, to consider measures in the event of an inability of both sides to reach a negotiated permanent two state solution. to think about ways of changing

the status quo, unilaterally has gotten a bad name since the withdrawal from gaza in 2000 five and to a large extent legitimately acquired a bad name. there were many mistakes made that then. that does not mean if palestinians leaders -- i think that to make immensely painful concessions. and take risk. if that proved them capable, i think israel can take measures that will minimize the damage to the international reputation. and also enable us to protect ourselves in case the situation in the west bank or elsewhere further deteriorates.

>> thank you for that question and answer. the gentleman here and then there. i am doing my best to go where i have seen people. >> don't you think it would help in dealing with the iranian nuclear program if israel admitted it does not have a nuclear weapons? >> they admit they did not have any nuclear weapons. israel will admit. i am correcting that make it up. israel's policy going back 50 years is it will not be the first country to reduce nuclear weapon. i think there is no chance they will change in that way. i actually do not see the relevance of the question. america has thousands of nuclear weapons. it does not protect the united states on 9/11. whatever israel's capabilities are on the it is not going to

protect israel if hezbollah heading -- according to the head of intelligence has somewhere in the area of 150,000 rocket. what do israeli capabilities are going to make any difference at all. israel is a tiny country, and all talks of the cold war calculi singh has mutually destroyed destruction is completely irrelevant. especially dealing with a government that i do not think is rational even in the way the soviet government was. so the question -- my answer to you is no, it will not make a difference. >> thank you. please. >> i am sorry.

>> i have two questions. let me take you back to when you mentioned the united states and the middle east may not be all bad. and could be taken as positive and not negative because they are the only player and able to meditate. doesn't this have a flipside that being the only responsible, capable player come it might be the focal attraction of radical extremist people because they are responsible of the solution of conflict. this is one question. what would you see as a more immediate threat? a faith-based or radical-based

popularity in the area, which would be a threat to israel to some extent, or the iranian threat? >> as to whether america support for engagement, i think it is not just support but engagement as a key mediator in the israeli palestinian dispute does that render america more vulnerable to attacks bikes? i think the record will show america was honorable to extremist hedgers even when it was succeeding stunningly in the peace process. after 1993, the oswald court americans were the target. then when the beast process was not going well, americans were the target. i think they will find no shortage for excuses for attacking the united states.

i think you look back at the record and it will show this. the overwhelming were not compelled towards america. it was not because of the support in the 1980's that many were kidnapped and executed. i mentioned obliquely some of the terrorist attacks that have been attempted on american soil. the details of the attempted attacks remain classified, but they were not impaired by america's support for israel. it is because america is america and what it represents and what it is. as for the second question, what is the greater threat? the upheaval in the middle east or the arabian nuclear program and the answer is unequivocal the nuclear program. the upheaval in egypt and the civil war in syria, the impact

has forces -- forced policymakers to rethink about all of their policies in the middle east that they have maintained over decades. it post new challenges. the peace border used to be an open border. it is no longer an open border. that had been a quiet border. it cannot be ignored. the threat to jordan is i think perhaps the greatest single challenge facing israel that arises from the arab spring. jordan is vital to the security. the security border is not the israeli jordanian border. that is very important.

all of that pales compared to the possibility that the regime that is on the record saying that the destruction of this state is part and parcel of the rate the -- race against death and will acquire nuclear capabilities can be made accessible and available to terrorist groups can trigger a nuclear arms race in the middle east in which egypt, saudi arabia will get nuclear weapons and israel will find itself inhabiting a profoundly unstable middle east. all of that so overshadows anything that has occurred since the winter of 2011. >> taking the last two questions . i will take them one after another and then we will be out of time. >> following on your answer about what advice you would give the israeli government in -- in the peace negotiations, do you

think the israeli government is pursuing the negotiations with an actual goal of a peace deal and do you think the same is true for palestinian eater ship? in other words, do they want a deal to come out of this war is the value simply and having the conversation and meeting the request that they do. >> thank you. peter sherborn minor or operation. you spoke on the impacts of events on the united states. how would you answer the question put in the following way, what is germany without peace done for u.s. interests in the past 50 years?

>> leslie go back to the question about israel /palestinians. as ambassador, i participated in many of the peace talks. virtually all the meetings between the prime minister and the secretary of state clinton and kerry, i can only assure you that yes, the israeli government is committed to moving ahead. to understand the price, but there are certain points -- certain points where the price becomes prohibited. one would be a two state solution that leaves israel's eastern border open to the type of armed -- arms smuggling that

has transformed gaza and southern lebanon into large missile pads. i do not think of any country in history that has faced the magnitude of 100 70,000 rockets that are pointed at israeli neighborhoods today. and he is unwilling to let that happen on the west bank. he is particularly adamant about the need for the two state solution to actually be of her minute and legitimate piece resolution, and that is why he is so adamant about the requirement. without it, you will have one state them at the state of palestine being a legitimate nation. an israeli state will not be able to recognize the jewish state -- the state of the jewish people. this will open the door to endless argument.

actually, the support i think for recognition is the way you get to peace. people who care about peace should understand it more deeply . on the palestinian side for the palestinians with whom i have interacted, i think they are sincere about reaching peace. on the palestinian side, and i tread lightly there is a greater question of not whether they are willing but whether they are able. i say this as a historian who has looked at previous rounds of attempts to create a two state says -- resolution going back to 1987. the history keeps repeating itself here. you can make a case that carter asked him a good state in 1979. each time no palestinians thought this was a good idea.

we were unable to deliver on the majority because they were threatened. the best example i can give you is i looked at the records in a book that i wrote about the six-day war. they sent out 80 researchers to canvass the possibility of creating a palestinian entity. almost all of the palestinian notables said to the israeli interviews, we would love to have this, but if we find on the dotted line with you the radicals will kill us. the radical they mentioned by name was yasser arafat. scoot ahead to the summer 2000 and they make the same argument to yasir arafat, and hit he says -- and he says i sign on the dotted line the radicals will kill me. full circle. no way to diminish the obstacles

that benjamin netanyahu and the ministers will encounter on route. there is no shortage of people even within the government and the parties that will opposed to it. i sincerely believe if it goes to a referendum, the israeli people will overwhelmingly approve it. i think they would have approved it in 2000 and in 2008. i am not sure about the palestinian side. i have to be honest about that. i hope it would be the case they would support it as well. what is the american gemini helping the peace interest over the past 50 years? here you are asking the impossible conundrum. a couple of years ago when i could still write things like this, i wrote an op-ed called the paradox of prophecy. it was about the book of jonah. it is the shortest book in the

bible. it tells the story of her profit who went to nineveh. if you do not repent, you will be destroyed. jonah realizes this is a no-win situation. if he goes to nineveh and tells them to repent and they do, or years later they will say why do we have to repent, nothing happened? or if he goes and are destroyed, then he is a false prophet. it is what i call the paradox of prophecy. it is in no-win situation. you could ask the same question in the middle east. if america had not named keynes over 50 years, maybe nothing would have happened. -- evan america had not maintain this for over 50 years, maybe nothing would have happened then

the paradox would have been there. why did america maintain the gemini? there is no conclusive answer to your question. the decision-makers in real-time is something i have learned to appreciate as a historian has to confront the paradox all of the time. every day. they have my sympathy and often by respect. sometimes even when they make the wrong decisions. they know if they make a certain decision, and may have untold consequences. if they do not make a decision and may also have untold consequences. consistently consecutively over the past half century and beyond american policymakers have overwhelmingly come down on the side of maintaining peace in

the middle east. i think with humility to some very powerful minds and i think some good hearts. you have to give them credit. >> thank you ambassador warren. let me say a couple of things in closing. this was a sterling debut from the ambassador. also everyone at the united council, thank you and welcome on board. [applause]

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afghanistan and iran. and some perspective on u.s.-france relations. ♪ >> good morning. it's tuesday, february 11. plenty of news from pennsylvania avenue. yesterday evening as house republicans finalize the bill that will raise the u.s. borrowing limit ahead of this debt ceiling deadline. meanwhile, the obama administration yesterday announced another delay of its affordable care act deadline. we will get to both of those stories this morning. let's focus on a washington free be